Axe 3 : Le modèle de gestion de risque des coopératives financières

Objectifs

La gestion des risques dans les organisations décentralisées doit partir d’un large partage de la culture du risque sur l’ensemble des entités d’une organisation.
Toutefois, il faut pouvoir répondre à un besoin de pilotage centralisé de plus en plus pointu, avec des outils adéquats. La notion de qualité des données est donc un enjeu majeur et une exigence règlementaire – par exemple dans le secteur bancaire – qui doit faire progresser les banques dans l’agrégation de leurs données de risques pour mieux prévenir les crises financières.
En outre, si jusqu’à présent les risques étaient pilotés sous cet angle de la contrainte règlementaire, il s’agit maintenant de bâtir une tour de contrôle unique. Ceci doit être un axe de développement principal pour toute entreprise.
La gestion des risques opérationnels représente également un enjeu primordial pour tous les secteurs d’activité. Autant les risques de crédit sont connus, localisés et maîtrisés, autant les risques opérationnels sont partout, transversaux, et plus difficilement évalués, avec des changements rapides de profil, (multiplication des cyber-attaques par exemple...).

Projet 1 : Étude en partenariat avec EACB sur la mise en place du SREP au sein des banques coopératives.

Porteurs : Stéphane Albert (IAE de Paris) / Georges Chappotteau (IAE de Paris)

“SREP” study

“Supervisory review and assessment process”

Relates to the main dimensions of bank risk governance as regarded by international regulation (primarily the Basle committee) and banking supervisors:

• Risk strategy
• Daily risk intake
• Risk control
• Management oversight

We do not substitute to supervisors though... we are rather interested in how frameworks operated by FCG (local vs. central units) cope with these dimensions, while considering the following questions:

• Does risk regulation inevitably lead to centralization and weakening of the position of financial cooperatives ?
• Does this call into question their capacity for deciding at local levels, for maintaining their cooperative specificities ?

The first stage of the study relies on a broad questionnaire, filled during field interviews with risk managers

4 major groups (regarded by authorities as “systemic” groups) have participated this summer:

• BPCE (France)
• BVR (Germany)
• Cajamar (Spain)
• Mouvement Desjardins (Canada)

As well as the Canadian AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers)

Example of focus, daily risk intake :

Owing to specific risks, there are large differences in the daily authority of the central unit. But liquidity risk management tends to be centralized, and credit risk a shared responsibility (local decision on usual loans / risks)
Daily management can be less centralized than the strategy (though seemingly correlated)

Main current findings

• Marked on-going shifts in the risk organization since prudential regulation extends to governance, overall centralization trend
• No convergence towards a single governance model though. One group has centralized, but others operate “integrated” or rather decentralized models
• Cooperative groups thrive to capitalize on strong knowledge of customers and the capacity of decision of local units, while seeking for synergies and group-wide coherent frameworks
• The participative dimension, e.g. the presence of local units in central boards of directors (≠ commercial bank holdings), is key to the design and the adherence to the framework – and enables to monitor the central unit itself
• Increasing regulatory requirements (and complexity) challenge the “remaining” decentralized matters and the participative dimension
• Alternative to more centralized schemes, IPS may however provide with an interesting risk governance and capital benefits. The paper also raises the underlying question of training the members (customers) elected to boards

Paper drafted this month: “L’impact de la réglementation financière sur la politique et la gestion des risques des coopératives financières”

Next steps

• Gather feedbacks on this first paper, a.o. during :

  The Cooperative Summit of Québec (11-13 Oct. 2016)
  Another series of meetings/calls with participating groups
  A presentation at the EACB ?

• Enlarge the study to more groups with a narrower questionnaire
  (Rabobank and Federcasse agreed to participate, other groups to be contacted)
• Refine the paper, and seek for academic publication

Projet 2 : La problématique de la gestion des risques dans les organisations décentralisées

Porteurs : Stéphane Albert (IAE de Paris) / Georges Chappotteau (IAE de Paris) / Laetitia Legalais / Prof. Frédéric Gautier

Status :

project launched in spring, positioning in the literature / research questions are under completion

Headlines

• Empirical study aiming to test theoretical models about the positive effects on risk level of centralizing the risk strategy but also of decentralizing some daily decisions: e.g. Stein (2002, JOF), Ozbas (2005, JFE)
• Financial cooperatives seem be good candidates for test since (i) they are naturally / historically more decentralized commercial banks (ii) capital is mostly local, (iii) they have a significant market share
• Variables to explore (?): consolidated supervision or not, presence of IPS (or other simpler guarantee schemes), density of local entities network, # of layers of the structure, presence of local/central CRO...
  Controlling for : financial and operational leverage, income structure, size, country,...

Projet 3 : La relation business model / risk appetite

Porteurs : Stéphane Albert (IAE de Paris) / Georges Chappotteau (IAE de Paris) / Laetitia Legalais /Prof. Frédéric Gautier

Status:

project launched in spring, positioning in the literature / research questions are under completion

• Principles for an effective Risk appetite Framework (FSB, 2013)
• SSM Supervisory statement on governance and risk (ECB, 2016)

Headlines

• Qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with CRO and management controllers to understand and analyze the interactions between RAF, strategic decision making and budgeting: measurement infrastructure and indicators, reporting and monitoring infrastructure, policies and guidelines, accountabilities
• Theoretical backgound based on Barley and Tolbert Framework (structure and agency) as used by P. Jarzabkowski studies
• Variables to explore (?): risk appetite dashbord (metrics), material non-financial risks included, organizational consequences of an integrated approach, drill-down of risk appetite and tolerances